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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(k) because this is an appeal from a final decision of the District 
Court. This appeal has been retained by the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Questions Presented and Standards of Review 
1. Did the District Court err in entering its Order dismissing with prejudice 
Chad Hudgens' ("Hudgens") Complaint and entering judgment in favor of Prosper, Inc. 
("Prosper") and Joshua Christopherson ("Christopherson") (collectively referred to as the 
"Prosper Defendants")? 
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by entering its Order denying 
Hudgens' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint? 
B. Standards of Review 
District Court's Conclusions of Law: With respect to the Order granting Prosper's 
Motion to Dismiss and dismissing Hudgens' Complaint with prejudice, the trial court's 
legal conclusions should be "reviewed for legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 
422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial 
court's conclusions of law no deference but instead review them for correctness."); 
Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e 
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afford no deference because they are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for 
correctness."). 
District Court's Denial of Hudgens5 Motion to Amend the Complaint: With 
respect to the trial court's denial of Hudgens5 Motion to Amend the Complaint, the trial 
court's Order should be reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. Turville v. J J. 
Properties, LQ 145 P.3d 1146, 1150 (UT. App. 2006). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
U.C.A. § 34A-2-105(1) is of central importance to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below 
On January 17, 2008 Hudgens filed a Verified Complaint ("Complaint") against 
the Prosper Defendants and alleged as causes of action: assault and battery, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, wrongful termination and intentional interference with 
contractual relations. Record on Appeal ("R.") at 0011-0004. On March 10. 2008, the 
Prosper Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Hudgens' Complaint on the grounds that 
all of Hudgens5 claims were barred as a matter of law under the Utah Worker's 
Compensation Act's Exclusive Remedy Provision. U.C.A. § 34A-2-105(1). R. at 20. 
On July 23, 2008, after the Court heard oral argument on the Prosper Defendants5 
Motion to Dismiss, the Court issued a ruling granting the Motion to Dismiss and 
dismissed all of Hudgens5 claims as a matter of law. R. at 92. Specifically, the Court 
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dismissed Hudgens' intentional tort claims without prejudice and ruled that they were 
barred by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act's Exclusive Remedy Provision. R. 90-
89. The Court dismissed with prejudice Hudgens' claim for intentional interference with 
contractual relations on the basis that the parties had agreed in open Court to a dismissal 
of such. R. at 90. Lastly, the Court dismissed Hudgens' wrongful termination cause of 
action, without prejudice, on the grounds that Hudgens failed to plead any facts sufficient 
to allege a violation of a clear and substantial public policy. R. at 89-87. 
B. Disposition in the District Court 
On October 7, 2008 the Court entered an Order dismissing the Hudgens' 
Complaint consistent with the Ruling. R. at 112. On October 3, 2008, Hudgens filed a 
Motion for Leave to File a Verified Amended Complaint ("Amended Complaint"). R. at 
107. The Prosper Defendants opposed the Motion and moved the trial court to dismiss 
the Complaint with prejudice. On March 27, 2009 the Court denied Hudgens' Motion for 
Leave to File an Amended Complaint and dismissed Hudgens' Complaint with prejudice. 
R. at 184. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The facts set forth by Hudgens' Brief were not determined by the Court in any of 
the proceedings below. Rather, the "facts" are simply a recitation of the allegations as set 
forth in Hudgens' Complaint and Proposed Amended Complaint. However, because the 
procedural posture of this case was decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the 
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Complaint, the Court accepted Hudgens' factual allegations contained therein as true for 
purposes of determining the Prosper Defendants5 Motion to Dismiss. Thus, for purposes 
of this appeal, Hudgens" facts as asserted in the Complaint will be deemed admitted. 
However, the facts as alleged in the Proposed Amended Complaint are not admitted and. 
where inconsistent or contrary to the allegations of the Complaint they should be 
disregarded for purposes of reviewing the trial court's Order dismissing the Complaint. 
In addition to Hudgens' Statement of Facts, the Prosper Defendants set forth the 
following additional facts: 
1. On January 17, 2008 Hudgens filed a Complaint against the Prosper 
Defendants and alleged as causes of action: assault and battery, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, wrongful termination and intentional interference with contractual 
relations. R. at 11-4. 
2. In support of Hudgens' causes of action for assault and battery and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, Hudgens specifically alleged that: 
a the Defendants "intentionally engaged in physically and emotionally 
abusive and intimidating conduct for the express purpose of increasing the 
productivity of the team." See Verified Complaint at f^ 10, R. at 10. (emphasis 
added). 
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b. "[Defendants] asked for volunteers for a new motivational exercise . . . In 
an effort to prove his loyalty and determination to [Defendants], Hudgens 
volunteered." Id. at f^ 12, R. at 9. (Emphasis added). 
c. "the conduct of [Defendants] was undertaken in bad faith and was in 
reckless disregard of and wanton indifference towards the rights of [Hudgens]. Id. 
at^25. 
d. "[Defendants] intentionally utilized means of physical and emotional 
intimidation and cruelty for the express purpose of causing [Hudgens] . . . to 
generate more revenue for the company." Id. at f^ 27 (emphasis added). 
3. On March 10, 2008, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Hudgens5 
Verified Complaint on the grounds that all of Hudgens' claims were barred as a matter of 
law. R. at 20. 
4. On July 23, 2008, after the Court heard oral argument on the Motion to 
Dismiss, the Court issued a ruling granting the Motion to Dismiss and dismissed all of 
Hudgens' claims as a matter of law. R. at 92. Specifically, the Court dismissed 
Hudgens' intentional tort claims without prejudice and ruled that they were barred by the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act's Exclusive Remedy Provision. R. 90-89. The Court 
dismissed with prejudice Hudgens' claim for intentional interference with contractual 
relations on the basis that the parties had agreed in open Court to a dismissal of such. R. 
at 90. Lastly, the Court dismissed Hudgens' wrongful termination cause of action, 
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without prejudice, on the grounds that Hudgens failed to plead any facts sufficient to 
allege a violation of a clear and substantial public policy. R. at 89-87. A copy of the 
Court's Ruling is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit A. 
5. On October 7, 2008 the Court entered an Order dismissing the Hudgens' 
Complaint consistent with the Ruling. R. at 112. A copy of the Order is attached hereto 
as Addendum Exhibit B. 
6. On October 3, 200 85 Hudgens filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended 
Complaint. R. at 107. The Prosper Defendants opposed the Motion and moved the trial 
court to amend the earlier Order of dismissal and dismiss all Hudgens' claims with 
prejudice. R. at 164. 
7. On March 275 2009 the Court denied Hudgens' Motion for Leave to File an 
Amended Complaint and dismissed Hudgens5 Complaint with prejudice. R. at 184. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
According to Hudgens, the Prosper Defendants are liable on several causes of 
action relating to Hudgens' employment at Prosper and his subsequent resignation. 
However, Hudgens' intentional tort causes of action cannot be brought because they are 
prohibited under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provision. 
This is so because Hudgens failed to plead that the Prosper Defendants had a deliberate 
and conscious intent directed to the purpose of inflicting injury on Hudgens. This Court 
has recently held that in order to overcome the exclusive remedy provision of the Act an 
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employer must have actual knowledge of a dangerous condition after which the employer 
still requires a specific employee to perform a specific task. Accordingly, this Court 
should affirm the dismissal of Hudgens' intentional tort claims with prejudice, pursuant to 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
Further, the dismissal of Hudgens' wrongful termination claim must be affirmed 
because Hudgens has failed to allege facts demonstrating that he was terminated for 
reasons that contravene a clear and substantial public policy. As such, this Court should 
affirm the dismissal of Hudgens' wrongful termination claim with prejudice, pursuant to 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
Finally, Hudgens' Motion to Amend was properly denied by the trial court. 
Hudgens admitted, under oath, that the purpose of the Prosper Defendants' conduct was 
not to injure but to motivate. Because Hudgens had made these admissions under oath, 
the trial court properly denied Hudgens5 request to contradict his earlier sworn 
statements. The trial court also properly denied Hudgens' Motion to Amend his wrongful 
termination cause of action because he completely failed to articulate and allege any facts 




I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING HUDGENS' 
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, 
A. Standard Governing Motions to Dismiss 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the trial court must 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and indulge all 
reasonable inferences in its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 
1058 (Utah 1991). A complaint is required to give the opposing party "fair notice of the 
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation 
involved," and if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief 
under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim, then the plaintiff 
has failed to state a claim. Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Serv., Inc., 467 
P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1970). A motion to dismiss is properly granted in cases in which 
"even if the factual assertions in the complaint were correct, they provide no legal basis 
for recovery." Mackeyv. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Utah App. 2000). 
Finally, with respect to the issue in this case that Hudgens5 claims are barred by 
the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act, "a complaint, to 
survive a motion to dismiss, must do more than merely allege intentional injury as an 
exception to the general exclusiveness rule; it must allege facts that add up to a deliberate 
intent to bring about injury." Lantz v. National Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937, 940 
(Utah App. 1989). (Emphasis added). 
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In the present case, the trial court's Order should be affirmed that even if the 
factual assertions in Hudgens5 Complaint are deemed true, they nevertheless provide 
Hudgens no legal basis for recovery because they are barred by the exclusive remedy 
provision. 
B. Hudgens9 Intentional Tort Claims Are Barred as a Matter of Law by 
the Utah Worker's Compensation Act's Exclusive Remedy Provision. 
The Utah Worker's Compensation Act ("Act"), U.C.A. § 34A-2-105(l), provides a 
comprehensive bar against any action at law brought by an injured employee: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries 
sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the 
exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of 
the employer imposed by this chapter shall be in place of any and all other 
civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise . .. and no action at 
law may be maintained against an employer or against any other officer, 
agent, or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or 
death of an employee. 
(emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the exclusive remedy provision 
of the Act bars common-law tort actions requiring proof of physical or mental injury. 
Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corporation, 16 P.3d 555, 560-561 (Utah 2000). See also 
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah 1991). 
In Shattuck, the Supreme Court stated: 
The workers' compensation system constitutes a quid pro quo between 
employers and employees. Under the Act's balancing of rights, employees 
are able to recover for job-related injuries without showing fault and 
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employers are protected from tort suits by employees by virtue of the Act's 
exclusive remedy provision.. . It is well settled that the Act covers . . . 
mental and physical injuries sustained on the job. Accordingly, we have 
held that the exclusive remedy provision bars common-law tort actions 
requiring proof of physical or mental injury. 
ShattuckdX 560-561 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
However, despite the absolute language of § 105(1) over the years Utah courts 
have recognized a very narrow exception to the Act's exclusivity provision for mental 
and physical injuries sustained by an employee. In Lantz v. National Semiconductor 
Corp., 775 P.2d 937 (Utah App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals carefully defined the 
limited scope of the exception under which a common-law tort action for injury can be 
maintained against an employer or its employees. The Court adopted the almost 
nationally uniform standard that the narrow exception applies only when an employee 
demonstrates an employer's "conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of 
inflicting injury." Id. at 939 (citingHildebrandt v. Wliirlpool Corp., 364N.W.2d 394, 
396 (Minn. 1985)). In adopting the above standard, the Lantz Court rejected the 
"substantial certainty standard" which is a recognized standard in the area of common tort 
law. Id. 
The Lantz Court held that liability under the foregoing exception to the Act's 
exclusive remedy provision: 
[c]annot5 under the almost unanimous rule, be stretched to include 
accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, willful deliberate, 
intentional reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute or 
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other misconduct of the employer short of a conscious and deliberate intent 
directed to the purpose of inflicting an injury. (Emphasis added). 
Lantz at 939-940 {citing 2A A. Larsen, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 68.13 
(1988)). The Lantz Court stated that "a complaint, to survive a motion to dismiss, must 
do more than merely allege intentional injury as an exception to the general exclusiveness 
rule; it must allege facts that add up to a deliberate intent to bring about injury." Id. at 
940. (Emphasis added). 
In Utah, the Act's exclusive remedy provision has been consistently applied in 
harmony with the Lantz analysis. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's order 
dismissing an employee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In 
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., supra, the court addressed a situation in which an 
employee brought a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against his 
employer for certain alleged conduct by a co-worker. The court analyzed the claim in 
light of the Act's exclusive remedy provision, under which employers are immune from 
any and all civil liability arising out of an employee's physical or mental harm sustained 
during his employment, and ruled that such a claim is barred by the Act. Id. at 1058; 
U.C.A. § 34A-2-105(l). In so ruling, the court stated that if the action for damages for 
infliction of emotional distress is to recover for injury, the action is therefore barred by 
the Act. Id at 1058. 
Recently, the exclusive remedy provision of the Act was again addressed in Helfv. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 203 P.3d 962 (Utah 2009). In Helf9 this Court was concerned with 
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a trial courts' application of the legal concept of "intent" as it pertained to defining 
conduct under the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. The Court reaffirmed the 
holdings of Lantz and Mounteer and further clarified how courts should analyze and 
apply the "intent to injure standard." The Helf Court reiterated that intentional injuries 
"which fall within the intentional injury exception, and negligent or accidental injuries, 
which are covered by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act." Id. at 970. 
The Court then engaged in a careful and complicated analysis of the "intent to 
injure" standard by distinguishing between the legal concept of intent and motive or 
desire. In so doing, the Court held that intent as opposed to motive, "is an intent to bring 
about a result which will invade the interest of another in a way that the law forbids." 
Helf, at 972. Ultimately, the Helf Court held that the intent to injure must focus first on 
whether the action which results in an injury was intentional and if so, focus on the 
actor's knowledge, i.e., whether the actor "knew" the specific injury would occur or that 
it was "virtually certain" to occur. Id. at 974. The Court also distinguished "intent" from 
"probability." On this point, the Court agreed with the South Dakota Supreme Court's 
holding that: 
More than knowledge or appreciation of risk is required to establish 
intentional conduct. The known danger must cease to become only a 
foreseeable risk which an ordinary, reasonable, prudent person would avoid 
(ordinary negligence) and become a substantial certainty. 
Id at 974, citing Fryer v. Kranz, 616 N.W.2d 102, 106 (S.D. 2000). 
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The Court held that an injury is unintentional, and barred by the Act, when it is 
"not a matter of when the injury would happen (a certainty). . . [but] if it would happen 
(a probability.)" Id. The Court adopted South Dakota's jurisprudence and held that in 
order to demonstrate an intentional injury and satisfy the "intent to injure" standard, a 
plaintiff must show that "the employer had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition 
and that the employer still required the employee to perform." Id. (emphasis added). As 
this Court explained, this "approach maintains the distinction between intent and 
probability by focusing on whether the actor knew or expected that injury would occur to 
a particular employee performing a specific task in determining whether an injury was 
intentional." Id. Finally, the Court held: 
that the intent to injure standard requires a specific mental state in which 
the actor knew or expected that injury would be the consequence of his 
actions . . . In other words, the employer must know or expect that a 
specific employee will be injured doing a specific task. 
Id. at 974 (emphasis added). 
Thus, after Helf, a plaintiff must have a "conscious and deliberate intent directed 
to the purpose of inflicting injury" and this "intent" is defined as an "actual knowledge of 
the dangerous condition" after which the "employer still requires a specific employee to 
perform a specific task." See Lantz, Helf, generally. This concept obviously includes the 
requirement that the resulting injury was the very injury that was intended by the 
employer. In this case, Hudgens alleges that the injury be sustained and for which he 
seeks damages was not the transitory discomfort that he alleges to have experienced 
13 
during the motivational exercise, it was the "symptoms of sleeplessness, anxiety and 
depression" for which he has received psychological counseling and has suffered 
physical and emotional harm." See Verified Complaint, ffl[ 19-20, R. at 8. 
Here, Hudgens correctly cites Helfs ultimate holding that in order to satisfy the 
"intent to injure" standard, "the employer must know or expect that a specific employee 
will be injured doing a specific task." See Brief at 12; He If at 91 A. This holding is 
consistent with Lantz and Utah law which the trial court applied in dismissing Hudgens' 
Complaint. However, Hudgens attempts to seize on Helfs dicta to overcome the fatal 
deficiencies of his Complaint. Specifically, Hudgens cites Helfs discussion that an 
intentional injury may arise even when the employer's motive was to increase profits, and 
not to inflict injury. See Brief at p. 15; HelfdX 972. However, this language is 
inapplicable to this case because Hudgens' Complaint specifically alleges that the intent 
and purpose of the exercise was "to motivate" and not to injure. See Complaint; R. at 
0011; Ruling at p. 4; R. at 0089. This allegation does not speak to motive, it speaks to 
intent and knowledge or belief of the actor. Christopherson believed that the 
motivational exercise would create a motivational state of mind in Hudgens, that it would 
inspire him. There is no allegation in the Complaint as to Christopherson's knowledge or 
belief, except that Christopherson is alleged to have believed the experience would result 
in a motivational feeling in Hudgens. This is a far cry from intent to cause the injuries 
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Hudgens alleges to have suffered. Thus, Hudgens' own sworn admissions specifically 
bar his claims under the exclusive remedy provision. 
In this case, the trial court dismissed Hudgens5 intentional tort claims because "the 
allegations contained in the complaint are not sufficient to support a claim that the 
defendant had a conscious and deliberate intent to injure plaintiff." See Ruling, R. at 
0089. Although the trial court did not engage in the Helf intent vs. motive analysis, it 
reached the correct conclusion. The trial court specifically found that: 
The complaint contains no facts showing that Christopherson took his 
actions based on a conscious and deliberate intent to injure plaintiff. 
Indeed, plaintiff asserts that the express purpose of Christopherson's 
abusive and intimidating conduct was to motivate team members, not to 
injure plaintiff 
See Ruling, R. at 0089. (Emphasis added). 
As the trial court found, Hudgens' Complaint failed to allege any facts to satisfy 
the "intent to injure" standard and support a claim that "[the Prosper Defendants] had 
actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and that the [they] still required [Hudgens] 
to perform." Rather, Hudgens, under oath, specifically alleged that he volunteered for the 
exercise and that the acts complained of were intentionally done, or were "undertaken in 
bad faith and . . . in reckless disregard of and wanton indifference towards the rights" of 
Hudgens. See Complaint, UH 25, 27; R. at 7. Hudgens further alleged that the intent of 
the acts complained of were "for the express purpose of causing Hudgens and others to 
generate more revenue for the company" and in an "attempt to improve [Hudgens'] sales 
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performance and therefore the sales performance of Christopherson's team and the 
revenue of the company", not to injure Hudgens. Id.; see also Ruling. 
Notably, the conduct asserted by Hudgens in this case is specifically identified in 
Lantz as being barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act (i.e., that the 
Defendants' actions were undertaken in "bad faith and . . . reckless disregard of and 
wanton indifference towards the rights" of Hudgens). See Complaint, fl 25, 27; R. at 
0011. Under Lantz, injuries caused by reckless disregard and/or wanton indifference 
cannot be maintained and must be dismissed. 
Moreover, because Hudgens volunteered for the exercise, it cannot be argued that 
he was "required" to perform the activity which caused the injury.1 Helf at 974 (quoting 
Fryer v. Kranz, 616 N.W. 2d 102, 106). As set forth above, in order for conduct to be 
exempt from the exclusive remedy provision, Helf requires that an employer must know 
of the danger and still require the employee to perform. Helf at 91 A. Indeed, because of 
the voluntary nature of Hudgens' participation in the exercise there can be no "intent to 
injure" on the Prosper Defendants' part. Thus, there can be no "invasion of [Hudgens'] 
interests in a way that the law forbids." Id. at 972. And Hudgens' voluntary conduct 
precludes the application of the exception to the exclusive remedy provision. 
1
 Moreover, simply because Hudgens inserts the inflammatory term "water boarding" for 
shock value, Hudgens is not somehow automatically relieved from the burden to plead 
facts sufficient to demonstrate that the Prosper Defendants had a "conscious and 
deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting injury." Indeed, Hudgens' use of the 
term in the Complaint has no meaning at all. Whether or not the sales team leader's 
judgment could be questioned, Hudgens' use of the term "water boarding" does not add 
any factual basis to satisfy the pleading standard. 
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Therefore, because Hudgens' Verified Complaint fails to meet the "intent to 
injure" standard adopted under Helf requiring a plaintiff to allege and demonstrate that 
"the employer had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and that the employer 
still required the employee to perform", the trial court's Order dismissing Hudgens5 
intentional tort claims with prejudice must be affirmed. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
C. Hudgens' Complaint Fails To State a Claim for Wrongful 
Termination. 
Utah courts have held that the rule regarding the employer-employee relationship 
is that the relationship is terminable at the will of either party subject to a very few 
narrow exceptions. Hancockv. Luke, 173 P. 137 (Utah 1918); Held v. American Linen 
Supply Co., 307 P.2d 210 (Utah 1957); Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 354 
P.2d 559 (Utah 1960); Rose v. Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986) 
(recognizing narrow exceptions to the at-will rule by federal and state legislation). 
The law in Utah is settled that when an employee is not hired for a specified 
period of time, the law presumes that either the employer or the employee may terminate 
the employment relationship at any time for any reason or no reason at all. Johnson v. 
Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1991). As such, the employer is not liable to 
the employee for terminating the employment relationship and the employer's decision to 
terminate an employee is presumed to be legal and valid. Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 
P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1991); Touchardv. LA-Z-BOY, INC, 148 P.3d 945, 948 (Utah 2006). 
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A discharged employee can overcome the at-will presumption only by showing 
one of three narrow exceptions recognized by Utah law: (1) there is an implied or express 
agreement that the employment may be terminated only for cause or upon satisfaction of 
some agree-upon condition; (2) a statute or regulation restricts the right of an employer to 
terminate an employee under certain conditions; or (3) the termination of employment 
constitutes a violation of clear and substantial public policy. Touchard at 948. 
Hudgens' Complaint alleges no facts to support a claim for wrongful discharge. 
First, the Complaint contains no facts alleging that Hudgens had an implied or express 
contract with Prosper. Second, the Complaint neither cites nor alleges thai the Hudgens 
was terminated in violation of a state or federal statute. Third, the Complaint fails to 
allege facts that Hudgens was terminated for reasons that contravene a clear and 
substantial public policy. See Ruling, R. at 0089. Although no facts were alleged to 
support a claim of wrongful discharge, Hudgens argued that the public policy exception 
was sufficiently implicated to survive a motion to dismiss. 
To be clear, the Complaint does not assert that Hudgens was terminated in 
violation of a recognized public policy exception to the at-will employment presumption. 
However, even if Hudgens had alleged such, the claim would fail as a matter of law. In 
order to make out a prima facie case for wrongful discharge based on the public policy 
exception, a plaintiff must plead and establish facts to support each of the following 
elements: (1) that his employer terminated him; (2) that a clear and substantial public 
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policy existed; (3) that the employee's conduct brought the policy into play; and (4) that 
the discharge and the conduct bringing the policy into play are causally connected. Ryan 
v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an employee has a cause of action under 
the public policy exception if his or her termination violated a clear and substantial public 
policy. Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 950 (Utah 2004). However, the Court has 
defined only four categories that invoke a clear and substantial public policy: (1) 
discharging an employee for refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act; (2) 
discharging an employee for performing a public obligation; (3) discharging an employee 
for exercising a legal right or privilege; and (4) discharging an employee for reporting an 
employer's criminal activities to the appropriate authorities. Ryan at 408; Touchard at 
948-949. Hudgens' complaint does not attempt to identify any violation of public policy, 
let alone identify a specific category of public policy recognized in Utah. 
Here, the dismissal of Hudgens' claim for wrongful termination must be affirmed 
because Hudgens has not demonstrated that (1) he was terminated; (2) that a clear and 
substantial public policy existed; (3) that Hudgens' conduct brought the policy into play; 
and (4) that the discharge and the conduct bringing the policy into play are causally 
connected. Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998). 
First, the Complaint fails to allege that Prosper terminated Hudgens' employment. 
Rather, Hudgens admits he resigned but contends that he was constructively terminated. 
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{See Complaint, 1JU 29-30). R. at 0011. However, to the extent Hudgens claims he was 
constructively discharged, the Complaint fails to set forth sufficient facts to support such 
a claim. Although the Utah Supreme Court has said that a resignation under working 
conditions that a reasonable employee would consider intolerable is equivalent to a 
termination (Touchard at 954), Hudgens has failed to set forth any facts to meet this 
standard. Merely asserting "constructive discharge" in substitution of an actual firing 
does not modify the underlying analysis of a wrongful termination claim. As such, 
Hudgens must still plead facts sufficient to establish an exception to the at-will 
relationship in order to make out a cause of action for wrongful discharge or termination. 
M a t 954-955 
Next, Hudgens' Complaint completely fails to set forth any facts to support his 
claim that a clear and substantial public policy existed, that Hudgens5 conduct brought 
the public policy into play, and that the discharge and any conduct bringing the policy 
into play are causally connected. Dan's Food Stores, Inc. at 404. In fact, the first time 
Hudgens alleged he was discharged in violation of a clear and substantial public policy 
was in his Opposition to Prosper's Motion to Dismiss, not in the Complaint. R. at 69. 
Hudgens5 argument that his "constructive termination violated a clear and 
substantial public policy interest under Utah law" (Brief at 17), is not supported by any of 
the only four recognized public policies under Utah Law. Instead, Hudgens argues that 
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the violated public policy was "the public policy underlying the numerous statutory and 
common law protections and penalties regarding the physical and emotional integrity of 
Utah Citizens.5'2 Id. at 17-18. Hudgens cites Utah's "Hazing" statute to support this 
novel and unrecognized public policy as an exception to the at-will employment doctrine. 
However, this suggested public policy is not recognized as such by this Court. 
Indeed, Hudgens has ignored the only four categories which invoke a clear and 
substantial public policy: (1) discharging an employee for refusing to commit an illegal 
or wrongful act; (2) discharging an employee for performing a public obligation; (3) 
discharging an employee for exercising a legal right or privilege; and (4) discharging an 
employee for reporting an employer's criminal activities to the appropriate authorities. 
Ryan at 408; Touchard at 948-949. Thus, Hudgens' newly created public policy 
"regarding the physical and emotional integrity of Utah Citizens" does not exist under 
this Court's established case law and must be denied. 
Finally, Hudgens goes so far as to argue that he was terminated for "refusing to 
commit an unlawful act." See Appellant's Brief at p. 21.3 The weakness of this 
argument is readily apparent as there are no facts pled in the Complaint to support a claim 
2
 Were Hudgens' articulated public policy to be adopted by the Court, the variations on 
what could constitute an affront to "the physical and emotional integrity" of a Utah 
Citizen would be endless and completely beyond any court's ability to set boundaries 
around the policy. It would be utterly unmanageable as a judicial exercise and 
completely unreasonable to elaborate such to a public policy category. 
Again, this allegation was raised for the first time in Hudgens' Opposition to Prosper's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
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that (1) Hudgens was requested to perform an illegal act, (2) that Hudgens refused to 
commit an illegal act, and (3) that Prosper terminated Hudgens for refusing to commit 
said act. 
Hudgens also argues that he was terminated because he refused "to work in an 
environment in which his employer behaved in an unlawful manner towards him." See 
Brief at 21. However, Hudgens confuses the "unlawful act" public policy exception to 
the at-will employment doctrine. In order to properly invoke a clear and substantial 
public policy, a plaintiff must plead and demonstrate that the employer discharged the 
employee for his refusal to commit an illegal or wrongful act. Ryan at 408. Even after 
recreating his story and facts, Hudgens has failed to identify any illegal act which he 
refused to perform as required by Ryan. Rather, Hudgens alleges that the illegal act was 
supposedly working in a hostile work environment. This is not an illegal act and does not 
satisfy the exception as set forth in Ryan and Touchard. 
Finally, even if Hudgens had alleged that his constructive termination violated a 
recognized public policy exception, Hudgens completely fails to demonstrate how his 
conduct brought the alleged public policy into play and how the discharge and the 
conduct bringing the policy into play are causally connected. Ryan v. Dan ;s Food Stores, 
Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998). On this point the trial court found that Hudgens 
failed to demonstrate how " [Hudgens5] conduct brought the policy of the hazing statute 
into play . . ." See Ruling; R. at 0087. And "the connection between the policy 
22 
embodied in the hazing statute and the other statutes cited by plaintiff and the conduct in 
question here is far too tenuous to comport with the repeated statements of the Utah 
Supreme Court emphasizing the narrowness of the public policy exception." Id. 
Therefore, because Hudgens has not pled any facts whatsoever to allege a 
violation of any recognized category of public policy and has not pled any facts to 
support a claim that Prosper discharged Hudgens for refusing to commit an illegal act, the 
trial court's order dismissing the wrongful termination claim must be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING HUDGENS5 MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
BECAUSE THE NEWLY CREATED FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ARE 
INCONSISTENT WITH HUDGENS5 PRIOR SWORN ADMISSIONS AND 
HIS CLAIMS NONETHELESS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. Hudgens Should not be Allowed to Amend his Intentional Tort Claims 
Because His Prior Sworn Admissions Demonstrate that these Claims 
Are Barred By the Worker's Compensation Act's Exclusive Remedy 
Provision. 
The trial court's denial of Hudgens5 Motion for Leave to File an Amended 
Complaint should be affirmed because the newly modified allegations contained therein 
expressly contradict Hudgens' prior sworn admissions regarding Defendant's express 
intent and purpose of the exercise and/or conduct allegedly causing the injury. Hudgens' 
Verified Complaint alleged under oath that the Prosper Defendants "intentionally 
engaged in physically and emotionally abusive and intimidating conduct for the express 
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purpose of increasing the productivity of the team." See Verified Complaint at \ 10; R. at 
0011 (emphasis added). 
Hudgens also alleged that following the motivational exercise, "Christopherson 
told the team that he wanted them to work as hard on making sales as Chad had worked 
to breathe55 during the exercise. Id. at 17. This allegation describes Christopherson's 
state of mind and expectation behind his act. Christopherson intended Hudgens "work 
hard to breathe55 expecting that the degree of difficulty working to breathe would be 
comparable to the degree of difficulty that a motivated employee would engage in to sell 
the products of the company. Certainly, this allegation precludes an allegation or finding 
that Christopherson "knew55 or expected with certainty that Hudgens would suffer 
psychological trauma, sleeplessness, anxiety, stomach pain or depression. See Complaint 
atffi[19-20,R.at8. 
Further, Hudgens previously alleged and admitted that "the conduct of [the 
Defendants] was undertaken in bad faith and was in reckless disregard of and wanton 
indifference towards the rights of [Plaintiff]. Id. at ^ 25 (emphasis added). Hudgens also 
made the sworn admission that the "[defendants] intentionally utilized means of physical 
and emotional intimidation and cruelty for the express purpose of causing [Plaintiff] . . . 
to generate more revenue for the company55 and in an "attempt to improve [Plaintiffs] 
sales performance and therefore the sales performance of Christopherson5 s team and the 
revenue of the company.55 Id. at ^ j 27-28 (emphasis added). Finally, Hudgens admitted 
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that Christopherson told the team members that the reason for the exercise was so that the 
team members would "work as hard on making sales as [Plaintiff] had worked to breath . 
. ." Id. at ^ 17 (emphasis added). On this point the trial court found that Hudgens 
asserted "the express purpose of Christopherson's abusive and intimidating conduct was 
to motivate team members, not to injure [Hudgens]." See Ruling, R. at 0089. 
In Utah, "a verified pleading that meets the requirements for affidavits can be 
considered a sworn statement."' Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121, 122 n. 1 (Utah 
1986); see Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1985) (stating that "[a] 
verified pleading, made under oath and meeting the requirements [of Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(e)], can be considered the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of a motion for 
summary judgment"). Also, Utah courts require that parties attempting to contradict 
prior sworn statements "adequately explain [the] contradiction." Brinton v. IHC 
Hospitals, Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 973 (Utah 1998).4 
In Brinton, the Utah Supreme Court approved the district court's decision not to 
allow a party that had submitted an affidavit in support of a motion for summary 
judgment to contradict a prior sworn statement. The Court noted that the district court 
"correctly held that[,] 'for purposes of the parties' motions for summary judgment, Dr. 
4
 Although the Brinton case dealt with the contradiction of a sworn statement in the 
context of a motion for summary judgment, the analysis is equally applicable to the 
present circumstances. See 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading § 538 (stating that, although a 
motion to dismiss and a motion on the pleadings are distinct, the analysis is not 
significantly different, as both require an analysis of the facts as pleaded). 
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Brinson's affidavit, as a matter of law, cannot contradict his prior sworn statement.5" Id. 
(quoting district court's order). The Court stated that contradiction is allowed only if the 
contradiction is "adequately explained" in the subsequent pleading. Id. (citing Webster v. 
Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983)). This principle applies to original verified 
pleadings. See 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence §792 (stating that "[a]n admission in an 
original verified pleading will remain binding as a judicial admission even after the filing 
of an amended pleading which supersedes the original.") (Emphasis added). 
Here, Hudgens5 Verified Complaint is a sworn statement. Hudgens cannot object 
to its use as a sworn statement at this point, as any objections to its evidentiary value in 
the case have been waived. See Pentecost. Moreover, Hudgens has not provided any 
explanation for the discrepancy between the original Verified Complaint and his 
proposed Amended Complaint, and there are no circumstances in this case that would 
justify such a substantial discrepancy in pleading Hudgens' theory of the case. The only 
explanation for the substantial discrepancies that exist in the two pleadings is that 
Hudgens has modified his factual allegations for the expediency of stating allegations that 
conform with the legal requirements of the claims. This reason is legally unacceptable. 
Therefore, the original Verified Complaint's factual allegations are binding on Hudgens. 
The trial court dismissed Hudgens' intentional tort claims as a matter of law, 
because, inter alia, the "Plaintiff asserts that the express purpose of Christopherson's 
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abusive and intimidating conduct was to motivate team members, not to injure plaintiff." 
See Ruling at p. 4 (emphasis added). 
The trial court's analysis of Christopherson's "purpose" in performing the 
motivational exercise does not conflict with this Court's analysis of the actors "specific 
mental state" and his knowledge that the injury was the desired consequence of his 
action. Helf, at 974. Indeed, purpose - as opposed to motive - addresses the actor's state 
of mind concerning his expectation of what would result from the intentional conduct. In 
Lantz, which was affirmed by the Helf court, the Court of Appeals held that the 
intentional injury exception applied "in situations characterized by 'a conscious and 
deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting injury." Lantz, 775 P.2d at 940. 
Similarly, in this case, the trial court read the Complaint to allege that Christopherson's 
purpose was not to inflict injury. 
Accordingly, because Hudgens has admitted in his Verified Complaint that the 
purpose of the exercise wras not to injure but to motivate, Hudgens' tort claims cannot 
overcome the immunity granted to employers by the Worker's Compensation Act's 
Exclusive Remedy Provision. See Ruling at 4. This legal deficiency remains true even 
after Hudgens has attempted to contradict his earlier admissions made under oath by the 
filing of the Proposed Amended Complaint. 
Indeed, contradicting his prior sworn admissions that Prosper's conduct was 
undertaken in bad faith and was in reckless disregard of and wanton indifference towards 
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the rights of Hudgens, Hudgens now alleges that Prosper "had a conscious and deliberate 
intent to injure [Plaintiff] by use of waterboarding.55 See Proposed Amended Complaint 
at f^ 17; R. at 102. However, and fatal to his claims, Hudgens continues to allege, even in 
the Proposed Amended Complaint, that Prosper5 s "physically and emotionctlly abusive . . 
. conduct [was] for the express purpose of increasing the productivity of the team." Id. at 
10 (emphasis added). 
As noted above, Hudgens5 Proposed Amended Complaint does not attempt to 
explain or withdraw Hudgens5 prior admission that the reason for the exercise was so that 
the team members would work as hard on sales as Hudgens worked to breath. See 
Verified Complaint at Tf 17. Importantly, Hudgens5 Verified admission, which 
demonstrates the purpose for the exercise, is binding on him regarding the Prosper 
Defendants5 intent. 
Moreover, Hudgens5 insertion of the buzz words "conscious and deliberate intent 
to injure55 may indicate an effort to promote the form of the allegation over the 
substantive facts in order to conform with the form of the legal standard, but it does not 
provide a sufficient basis on which Hudgens5 may amend his Verified Complaint or to 
overcome the court's Ruling, especially where the trial court previously found that 
Hudgens, under oath, admitted that the intent of the exercise was to motivate, not to 
injure. It is contrary to the law and the trial court's express findings to allow Hudgens to 
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change his sworn testimony, as to the factual purpose of Prosper's actions, in order to 
create a new theory of his case by the use of conclusory allegations. 
Therefore, because Hudgens has admitted under oath that the Prosper Defendants' 
purpose and intent in conducting the alleged exercise was to provide a motivational 
exercise, such admissions are binding and cannot now be retracted and superseded by 
amended allegations. Therefore, the trial court's Order denying Hudgens' Motion for 
Leave to File Amended Complaint should be affirmed because the intentional tort claims 
are barred by the Worker's Compensation Act's Exclusive Remedy Provision. 
This Court's review of the trial court's denial of Hudgens' Motion to Amend must 
be conducted on an abuse of discretion standard. Given the trial court's analysis and the 
allegations of the Verified Complaint, a determination that the trial court abused its 
discretion cannot be made or justified. 
B. Hudgens9 Wrongful Termination Claim Fails to Articulate a Clear and 
Substantial Public Policy and Therefore Must Not be Allowed. 
The trial court's Order denying Hudgens' Motion for Leave to Amend his 
wrongful termination claim should be affirmed. The trial court, in great detail, addressed 
Hudgens' fatal pleading deficiencies in his wrongful termination cause of action when it 
granted the Prosper Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court specifically held that in 
Utah the employer-employee relationship is presumed to be at-will and in order to 
overcome this presumption a party must show that his case falls within one of three 
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categories: (1) that an express or implied agreement exists, (2) that a statute or regulation 
restricts the right of an employer to terminate the employee under certain conditions or 
(3) that the termination constitutes a violation of a clear and substantial public policy. 
(See Ruling at 4-5; R. at 0089). 
The Court ruled that Hudgens had pled no facts in the Complaint alleging that any 
of these categories were applicable. However, in his Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss, Hudgens raised for the first time and argued that his "constructive 
termination" was wrongful because the termination violated a public policy. In response 
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Hudgens was permitted to fully argue any theory of 
public policy he felt was applicable to the circumstances of his termination of 
employment. However, the Court dismissed Hudgens's arguments because Hudgens was 
unable to articulate a recognized public policy that was violated by Hudgens's alleged 
constructive termination. Id. at 6. 
Hudgens's proposed Amended Complaint does nothing to improve upon the 
deficiency of his original Verified Complaint. Hudgens now alleges that he was 
terminated in violation of "a public policy in Utah regarding the physical and emotional 
integrity of Utah citizens, particularly in the workplace." (See Verified Amended 
Complaint at 30). Brief at 23. However, despite the general and vague reference to such 
an insubstantial and gossamer notion of "physical and emotional integrity" as a purported 
30 
public policy5 Hudgens fails to cite to any statute, case or other law stating that this is a 
recognized clear and substantial public policy which is considered sufficient to overcome 
the at-will employment presumption. Moreover, Hudgens fails to allege, as an essential 
element, that "[Hudgens'] conduct brought the public policy into play" and that Hudgens' 
conduct and the termination are causally connected. Rather, Hudgens only makes the 
bald and conclusory allegation that he was terminated, that there is an unspecified public 
policy "regarding" the physical and emotional integrity of Utah citizens in the workplace 
and that the public policy is connected to Hudgens's termination. See Verified Amended 
Complaint at 30-31. Brief at 23-24. However, Hudgens has completely failed to allege 
any facts demonstrating how Hudgens' conduct brought the policy into play or what, in 
fact, is the recognized clear and substantial public policy connected to the termination. 
Indeed, the proposed Amended Complaint completely fails to allege any facts 
demonstrating that Hudgens' "alleged termination" fits into one of the only four 
categories of public policy recognized by Utah law sufficient to overcome the at-will 
presumption. Simply put, Hudgens cannot articulate any facts demonstrating that his 
alleged termination violated any of the four categories that invoke a clear and substantial 
public policy, and there is no evidence that would support such an allegation if it had 
been made. 
Therefore, because Hudgens has not pled any facts whatsoever to allege a 
violation of any recognized category of public policy, he cannot support a claim for 
31 
wrongful termination based on the public policy exception to the at-will presumption of 
the employer-employee relationship. Therefore, Hudgens's Motion to Amend his 
wrongful termination cause of action must be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Prosper and Christopherson respectfully request that 
Hudgens' Appeal be denied and the trial Court's order dismissing the Complaint with 
prejudice be affirmed. 
DATED this ay of December, 2009. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
Evan A. Schmutz 
Andy V. Wright 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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Date: July 23, 2008 
Case No.: 080400249 
Judge: Gaiy D. Stott 
On March 11, 2008, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure in response to Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff filed an Opposition on April 
9, 2008, and Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum on April 21, 2008. The court heard oral 
arguments on July 14, 2008, and now issues this ruling. 
BACKGROUND 
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 
Rule 12(b)(6), the court "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor." Monnteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 
P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991). In that light, the court sets forth the facts of the case. 
Plaintiff Chad Hudgens ("Plaintiff) worked for defendant Prosper, Inc. ("Prosper"), as a 
member of the team supervised by defendant Joshua Christopherson ("Christopherson"). 
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Prosper provides self-help and motivational coaching to individual clients and Christopherson 
was one of Prosper's top income producers. Prosper and Christopherson engaged in physically 
and emotionally abusive and intimidating conduct for the express purpose of increasing the 
productivity of the team. This conduct included Christopherson patrolling the area with a large 
wooden paddle which he hit on tables and desks close to team members and removing chairs and 
drawing mustaches on team members that did not meet sales goals. 
In May of 2007, Christopherson asked for volunteers for a new motivational exercise 
without revealing the nature of the exercise. Plaintiff volunteered as a result of ChristophersoiVs 
appeal to the loyalty and determination of his team members. Christopherson took the team 
outside to the top of a nearby hill, where he ordered Plaintiff to lie down with his head facing 
downhill. Christopherson instructed other team members to hold Plaintiff by the arms and legs 
while Christopherson slowly poured a gallon jug of water over Plaintiffs mouth and nose, 
making it impossible for Plaintiff to breathe for a period of time. As Plaintiff was struggling, 
resisting and attempting to escape, Christopherson directed other team members to hold Plaintiff 
down. After this demonstration, Christopherson told the team that he wanted them to work as 
hard on making sales as Plaintiff had worked to breathe during the exercise. 
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff reported the incident to an employee in Prosper's human 
resources department. Prosper took no action, including action against Christopherson. until 
after Plaintiff left Prosper. After this incident, Plaintiff began to experience symptoms of 
sleeplessness, anxiety and depression. He began to feel sick to his stomach at work and was no 
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longer able to work at Prosper. As a result of the incident, Plaintiff has required psychological 
counseling and has suffered physical and emotional harm. 
DISCUSSION 
I Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations 
Based upon the stipulation of the parties on the record, the court grants the Motion to 
Dismiss with respect to the claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. Counsel 
for Plaintiff did not object to the dismissal of this claim. According to Utah case law, the 
defendant in a case for intentional interference with contractual relations must be a third party to 
the contract. The court concludes, and the parties agree, that Christopherson was not a third 
party to the contract between Plaintiff and Prosper. Therefore, the claim for intentional 
interference with contractual relations is dismissed with prejudice. 
II Assault and Battery and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The court grants the Motion to Dismiss with respect to the causes of action for assault 
and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Section 34A-2-105(l) of the Utah 
Code states that the remedy provided in the Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy 
of an employee who is injured or killed in the course of his employment. Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-105(l) (2008). As acknowledged by both parties, the Utah Supreme Court has created a 
narrow exception to the exclusiveness of the Workers' Compensation Act for those injuries that 
occur as a result of a conscious and deliberate intent on the part of the employer or its agent to 
inflict an injury upon the employee. Bryan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892 (1975); see also lantz v. 
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Nat'I Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937 (Utah App. 1989). InLantz, the Utah Court of 
Appeals explained that in order for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it "must allege 
facts that add up to a deliberate intent to bring about injury.'5 Id. at 940 fn. 5 (quoting 2A A. 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 68.14 at 13-46 (1988) (emphasis in original)). 
The allegations contained in the complaint are not sufficient to support a claim that the 
defendant had a conscious and deliberate intent to injure plaintiff From the court's perspective, 
Christopherson undoubtedly exhibited poor judgment to take the actions that led to this case. 
However, the purpose of those actions was to use plaintiff as an example of maximum effort for 
the rest of the employees to emulate as they did work for the company. The complaint contains 
no facts showing that Christopherson took his actions based on a conscious and deliberate intent 
to injure plaintiff. Indeed, plaintiff asserts that the express purpose of Christopherson's abusive 
and intimidating conduct was to motivate team members, not to injure plaintiff Therefore, the 
claims for assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress are governed 
exclusively by the Workers' Compensation Act and section 34A-2-105(l), and the Motion to 
Dismiss is granted with respect to the claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
Ill Wrongful Termination 
The court grants the Motion to Dismiss the claim for wrongful termination. In Utah, the 
employer-employee relationship is presumed to be at-will, and a plaintiff must show that his case 
falls within one of three categories to overcome this presumption: u(l) there is an implied or 
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express agreement that the employment may be terminated only for cause or upon satisfaction of 
some agreed-upon condition; (2) a statute or regulation restricts the right of an employer to 
terminate an employee under certain conditions; or (3) the tennination of employment 
constitutes a violation of a clear and substantial public policy." Touchard v. La-Z-Boy, Inc., 
2006 UT 71, P3 (citations omitted). Defendants argued, and Plaintiff conceded, that the first two 
categories are clearly not applicable. Therefore, the only category that is potentially applicable 
is termination in violation of public policy. 
In Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court 
set forth the following elements to make out a prima facie case for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy: "an employee must show (i) that his employer terminated him; (ii) 
that a clear and substantial public policy existed; (iii) that the employee's conduct brought the 
policy into play; and (iv) that the discharge and the conduct bringing the policy into play are 
causally connected." Id. at 404 (citations omitted). The court further emphasized the 
narrowness of the public policy exception and explained that the public policy at issue is clear 
and substantial "only if plainly defined by legislative enactments, constitutional standards, or 
judicial decisions." Id. at 405. 
As Defendants have argued, Plaintiffs complaint does not even address elements (ii) 
through (iv) of the prima facie case for wrongful tennination set forth in Ryan. However, in his 
Opposition and at the oral arguments, counsel for Plaintiff argued that there is public policy 
against this type of conduct which is made clear and substantial by the enactment of the statute 
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in the Utah Criminal Code prohibiting hazing. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107.5 (2008). While 
Plaintiffs reliance on the hazing statute is interesting, it fails to show how Plaintiffs conduct 
brought the policy of the hazing statute into play, especially since the conduct is only considered 
hazing if the victim is a member or potential member of a school team or the conduct was "for 
the purpose of initiation, admission into, affiliation with, holding office in, or as a condition of 
continued membership in any organization...." Id. at (l)(b)(i). In addition, the connection 
between the policy embodied in the hazing statute and the other statutes cited by Plaintiff and the 
conduct in question here is far too tenuous to comport with the repeated statements of the Utah 
Supreme Court emphasizing the narrowness of the public policy exception. See Hansen v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62, P9; Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405. The court concludes that Plaintiff has 
failed to make out a prima facie case for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 
Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted with respect to the claim for wrongful 
termination. 
IV. Amending the Complaint 
The court denies Plaintiffs request to amend his complaint because the request fails to 
comply with Utah's formal motion practice rules. Although Plaintiff notes that leave to amend 
should be freely given where justice so requires, the Utah Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 
have explained that denying a request to amend a complaint based on a failure to comply with 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is well within the discretion of the trial court. Holmes 
Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38; Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, P42. Indeed, 
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Plaintiffs request is nearly identical to the requests made in both Holmes and Coroles, the 
denials of which were upheld by the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, respectively. 
Because Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure, his request to amend 
the complaint is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are 
granted as to all claims. The claims for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and wrongful termination are dismissed without prejudice, and the claim for intentional 
interference with contractual relations is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs request to amend 
his complaint is denied. Counsel for Defendants shall prepare an order reflecting this mling and 
submit it to the court for signature. 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHAD HUDGENS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROSPER, INC., a Utah corporation and 
JOSHUA CHRISTOPHERSON, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 080400249 
Honorable Judge Stott 
This matter came before the Court on July 14, 2008 for oral argument on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff was represented by Sean N. Egan. Defendants 
were represented by Evan A. Schmutz. The Court having reviewed the pleadings and 
papers filed in connection with the Motion to Dismiss heard the arguments of counsel 
FLED 
OCT 0 7 200 
4TH D^STRi< 
STATE OF U 
1 
and took the matter under advisement. On July 23, 2008, the Court issued a written 
Ruling, granting Defendants' Motion and, good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Based on the stipulation of the parties made on the record and in open 
court, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss with respect to the claim for intentional 
interference with contractual relations because the defendants are not third parties to the 
employment contract between Plaintiff and Defendant Prosper, Inc., and under Utah law 
a claim for intentional interference can only be asserted against third parties to the 
contract. Dismissal of the claim for intentional interference with contractual relations is 
with prejudice. 
2. The Court grants the Motion to Dismiss as against the claims for assault 
and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress because the remedy provided 
under the Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for an employee who is 
injured or killed in the course of employment. Utah Code Ann., § 34A-2-105(l) (2008). 
Although Utah case law recognizes a narrow exception to the exclusive remedy of the 
Workers' Compensation Act, Laniz v. Nat'I Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937 (Utah 
App. 1989), Plaintiff has not alleged facts in the Complaint sufficient to support a claim 
that the defendant had a conscious and deliberate intent to injure the plaintiff. Therefore, 
the claims for assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress are 
dismissed without prejudice. 
2 
3. The Court grants the Motion to Dismiss as against the claim for wrongful 
termination. Under Utah law, plaintiff is presumed to be an "at-will" employee. The "at-
will" presumption can be overcome under Utah law by a showing that "(1) there is an 
implied or express agreement that the employment may be terminated only for cause or 
upon satisfaction of some agreed-upon condition; (2) a statute or regulation restricts the 
right of an employer to terminate an employee under certain conditions; or (3) the 
termination of employment constitutes a violation of a clear and substantial public 
policy." Touchard v. La-Z-Boy, Inc., 2006 UT 71 ^3. Plaintiff conceded that the first 
two categories are not applicable. The public policy exception is interpreted narrowly 
under Utah law. As to the public policy exception, Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient 
facts to make a prima facie case for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 
Therefore, the claim for wrongful termination is dismissed without prejudice. 
4. Although not made by formal motion, plaintiff requested leave to amend 
the complaint. The Court denies the request for leave to amend the complaint because 
plaintiff failed to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this ( day of S^fember, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ / 
mur 
Honorable GaiyVb. Stott 
Fourth DistriciC^ourt Judge 
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Approved as to form and substance: 
Sean N. Egan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the of September, 2008 she 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following: 
Sean N. Egan 
Parkside Tower - Suite 950 
215 South State Street 
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